Phenomenology

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Phenomenology (from the Greek: φαινόμενον phainómenon "visible, appearance" and λόγος lógos "speech, doctrine", literally the doctrine of appearances) is the doctrine or systematic study of appearances, phenomena, as they present themselves to the sensory or supersensory perception as directly given.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe based his scientific investigations on pure phenomenology and thus laid the foundations for Goetheanism. As a philosophical current, phenomenology was strongly influenced by Edmund Husserl, who was significantly influenced by Franz Brentano's phenomenological or descriptive psychology. A variant introduced in the 1960s by Hermann Schmitz and constantly developed since then is the New Phenomenology.

Anthroposophy as a phenomenological science

„Phenomenology, that is the ideal of scientific striving which is present in Anthroposophy.“ (Lit.:GA 73a, p. 362)

„A phenomenology is not a compilation of mere phenomena in an arbitrary way, or in such a way as results precisely from the scientifically conducted experiments, but a real phenomenology is such a systematisation of phenomena as was attempted, for example, by Goethe in his Theory of Colours. It is a tracing back of the complicated to the simpler, down to those foundations where the basic elements, the basic phenomena, are encountered.

Now, of course, I know quite well that quite clever people will now say: Yes, but if one gains such a set-up in relation to the connection of qualitative phenomena and primordial phenomena, such a set-up is by no means to be compared from the outset with the way in which, for example, complicated geometrical connections are to be traced back mathematically to axioms; for the geometrical connections are, as it were, built up from pure inner construction. The further construction of mathematics, [proceeding from] these axioms, is in turn experienced like a [mathematical process] perceived in inner necessity, whereas in the construction of phenomena and primordial phenomena we are dependent on relying on the observation of the external facts.

But this is not so, even if it is simply asserted in this way - it is, after all, asserted more or less clearly and unambiguously in the widest circle. That this is asserted is only the result of an incorrect epistemology, and especially the result of a confused confusion of the concept of experience with other concepts. And this confusing confusion of the concept of experience with other concepts results, for example, in the following.

No attention is paid to the fact that the way in which experience is present is quite formed in relation to the human subject. I cannot form the concept of experience without thinking of the relation of the object to the human subject. And now it is simply a question of this: is there a principled distinction between the way in which, for example, I have a Goethean primordial phenomenon before me and complicate this primordial phenomenon into a derived phenomenon, where I seem to be dependent on external experience confirming that which I pronounce in judgement? Is there a difference in this whole behaviour of the subject towards the object in relation to experience, compared to when I state in mathematics that the sum of the three angles of the triangle is 180°, or when I state the correctness of the Pythagorean theorem? Is there indeed a difference?

The fact that there is no difference in this respect has already emerged in the investigations of very witty mathematicians of the 19th century and up to our own day, who, because they saw that mathematics is, after all, only based on experience - in the sense in which one speaks of experience in the so-called empirical natural sciences - have added to Euclidean geometry a non-Euclidean geometry. And one has to say: theoretically, it is quite possible to think geometrically that the three angles of a triangle are 380°. However, one must presuppose that space has a different measure of curvature. In our ordinary space we have a regular [Euclidean] measure that has the curvature zero. By simply imagining that space is more curved [that is, that the curvature of space is greater than 1], one arrives at a sentence such as: the sum of the three angles of a triangle is greater than 180°.

Interesting attempts have been made in this respect, for example by Oskar Simony, who has investigated this. These efforts show that, from a certain point of view, it has been considered necessary to say to oneself: even what we express as judgements in mathematical or geometrical propositions requires empirical verification just as much as what we express in phenomenology.“ (Lit.:GA 73a, p. 124ff)

„If one does not close the door to the essence of things by stating from the outset something that may be thought about these phenomena of the outer world and their connection with man - for example, that which can be expressed mathematically - but if one has the will to enter into the real phenomena, then the phenomena actually begin to speak their own language.

And it is simply a misunderstood Kantianism, which is also a misunderstanding of the world view, when people keep talking about the fact that one cannot penetrate from the outer world of phenomena into the essence of things. He who can somehow come to terms with such thoughts logically, who has logic, knowledge in his soul, that he can come to terms with such things, realises that this talk of phenomena and of what is behind them as a "thing in itself" means nothing more than when I say: here I have written down S and O, I do not see the other, I cannot come from the S and O to the thing in itself, that tells me nothing, that is a theoretical appearance. But if I do not merely look at the S and O, but if I am able to read further and to read the phenomena, but here in this case to read the letters further, I do not merely look at them in such a way that I say: Here I have the phenomenon; I cannot get behind this phenomenon, I do not penetrate into the "thing in itself," but when I look at the phenomena as they brighten each other up, just as the darkness brightens up, then the reading of the phenomena becomes speaking and expresses that which is living in the essence of things. It is only an oration to speak of the opposition of appearances and the essence of things; that is like philosophising about the letter logic in Goethe's "Faust" and the meaning of Goethe's "Faust": when one has let all the letters speak one by one that belong to "Faust", then the essence of "Faust" is revealed. In a real phenomenology, the phenomena are not of the same kind or stand side by side, they relate to each other, they brighten each other up and the like. The one who does real phenomenology comes to the essence of things through the real phenomenological activity.“ (Lit.:GA 73a, p. 167f)

Literature
References to the work of Rudolf Steiner follow Rudolf Steiner's Collected Works (CW or GA), Rudolf Steiner Verlag, Dornach/Switzerland, unless otherwise stated.
Email: verlag@steinerverlag.com URL: www.steinerverlag.com.
Index to the Complete Works of Rudolf Steiner - Aelzina Books
A complete list by Volume Number and a full list of known English translations you may also find at Rudolf Steiner's Collected Works
Rudolf Steiner Archive - The largest online collection of Rudolf Steiner's books, lectures and articles in English.
Rudolf Steiner Audio - Recorded and Read by Dale Brunsvold
steinerbooks.org - Anthroposophic Press Inc. (USA)
Rudolf Steiner Handbook - Christian Karl's proven standard work for orientation in Rudolf Steiner's Collected Works for free download as PDF.

Weblinks

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